

**Office of Inspector General  
U.S. Department of State  
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
U.S. Information Agency, including  
Broadcasting Board of Governors**

# **Reports and Testimony**

## **January 1999**

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This report describes testimony provided by the Inspector General or other OIG officials and lists OIG reports issued during the period indicated. This report includes unclassified summaries of classified reports; all text in this report is unclassified. Classified reports are not distributed publicly. On occasion OIG distributes an unclassified version of a classified report; in such a case, this listing also indicates the issue date of the original report. In addition, all major reports, together with OIG investigative activities, are summarized in the Inspector General's semiannual reports to the Congress, which are publicly available every June and December.

## **Reports Issued by the Office of Audits**

### **Review of the Florida Regional Center (99-FM-002)**

The Office of Inspector General audited the regional financial management services provided to overseas posts by the Florida Regional Center (FRC). FRC provides assistance to six posts in the Caribbean and Latin America that do not have American financial management officers. In addition, FRC provides oversight and assistance to other Latin American and Caribbean posts with first tour financial management officers and posts that experience a temporary financial management officer staffing gap.

Our review found that (1) posts were satisfied with the services received from FRC, but FRC had no formal system for evaluating customer service; (2) financial management services provided to serviced posts were excellent and covered all major areas of financial operations, but, with the exception of serviced posts, a limited number of other posts had received FRC assistance; and (3) internal controls and management practices were in place, but additional internal controls needed to be established over regional financial management operations, including tracking and monitoring regional travel, maintaining centralized and consistent documentation, and establishing up-to-date Memorandums of Agreement with all of its serviced posts.

### **Audit of Activities Supporting the International Law Enforcement Academy Budapest, Hungary (99-CI-005)**

At the request of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), OIG reviewed the administration of funds made available to Federal agencies and U.S. embassies for training at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary. The objectives of the audit were to determine the funding made available by INL and spent by Federal agencies and U.S. embassies to support training at ILEA, review INL's oversight of these funds, and determine whether they are properly administered.

OIG found that it could not determine the actual cost of ILEA Budapest because financial reporting was not standardized, ILEA costs were mingled with those for other programs, and the costs of advanced courses given at ILEA were not readily identifiable under current accounting practices. We believe INL needs to improve oversight of ILEA funds by establishing a standard financial reporting system and by conducting annual financial reviews of funds spent in support of ILEA. Opportunities exist to use ILEA resources more efficiently, especially by reducing the number of U.S. based personnel sent to ILEA Budapest as instructors and by exploring less costly alternatives for coordinating core courses. The relevance and impact of current training efforts are not always clear and should be reviewed. OIG recommends that there be greater standardization of financial management procedures across fiscal years, standardized provision of fiscal citations to Embassy Budapest, and improved guidelines for U.S. embassies to follow when sent students to ILEA.

**January 1999**

## Reports Issued by the Office of Inspections<sup>1</sup>

### Embassy Kigali, Rwanda (ISP/I-99-06)

Four years after its re-opening following the genocide of almost one million Rwandans, Embassy Kigali is still dealing with the loss of continuity and the psychological trauma of that tragedy. That is reflected in weaknesses in coordination and communication, training, internal controls, and organization of procedures and records. United States relations with Rwanda are generally positive, but continued Rwandan military involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo raises U.S. concerns about regional security and stability.

#### *Key Issues Identified*

- The mission performance plan (MPP) is well drafted with a focus on U.S. humanitarian interests in Rwanda. However, it is not used as an active management tool by the executive. Section chiefs and agency heads need to be involved in an expanded and more structured dialogue on policy and programs.
- Reporting on political developments is impressive. The embassy's senior management should strive, however, to produce objective analyses and maintain a balanced, non-contentious tone in reporting.
- Post management has been eliminating security vulnerabilities and completing physical upgrades to its facilities.

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<sup>1</sup> Inspections carried out by the Office of Inspections comprehensively review the operations and overall management of a given post, mission, bureau, or office of the Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Information Agency, or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, without attempting to evaluate in-depth any particular function or program. Their main purpose is to bring important issues and management deficiencies to the attention of senior management together with recommendations for corrective action, although they also include self-evaluation and self-correction through counseling.

**Embassy Bujumbura, Burundi**  
**(ISP/I-99-07)**

Embassy Bujumbura is a critical threat post with seven officers and six Marine security guards. The Ambassador has been active in keeping the number of employees to a minimum, given an unstable security situation. The executive office has maintained excellent access to Burundi's decision makers despite the delivery of difficult and unpleasant demarches on Burundian positions. According to the MPP, the United States has no significant national security or commercial interests in Burundi; primary U.S. interests are to promote peace, provide humanitarian assistance to Burundians, and protect the small number of American citizens.

***Key Issues Identified***

- Department support for Embassy Bujumbura has been inadequate. It has not provided comment on the mission's MPP and has not established means to re-supply the post regularly after Burundi's neighbors imposed an economic embargo in 1996.
- The establishment of a defense attaché office and the addition of a second political officer are not advisable due to the need to minimize staffing as a result of current security concerns and the difficulties in supporting the post. The Marine Security Guard Detachment is also not necessary at this one-agency post with minimum security storage authority.

## **Reports Issued by the Office of Security and Intelligence Oversight<sup>2</sup>**

### **The Card Access Control System in Germany and Luxembourg** **(SIO/A-99-22)**

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed an audit of the card access control system used at U.S. diplomatic posts in Germany and Luxembourg. The audit is part of OIG's evaluation of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's (DS's) overall management of card access control systems used at U.S. diplomatic facilities overseas. The system in Germany and Luxembourg was intended to control access to diplomatic facilities, to reduce the cost of the DS Local Guard Program, and to provide a model for possible worldwide use. The acquisition of the card access control system reflected an attempt by DS to reduce costs. However, OIG questions whether:

- the system is properly qualified for use at overseas facilities;
- the system's sensitive information is adequately protected;
- the system's inactive identification cards are effectively controlled; and
- the system's risks, costs, and benefits were adequately assessed.

A number of recommendations were made concerning vulnerabilities identified by OIG during the audit.

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<sup>2</sup> Inspections undertaken by the Office of Security and Intelligence Oversight (SIO) evaluate the formulation, dissemination, and applicability of security standards set in Washington and their implementation at all U.S. diplomatic posts abroad. The SIO inspections assess the ability of each post to respond to threats from terrorism, mob, or other physical intrusion, hostile intelligence activities, and crime, and recommend specific corrective actions to eliminate or reduce the security vulnerabilities identified. Because they discuss specific security problems at the inspected posts, the reports are classified and are distributed on a strict need-to-know basis.

**Security Followup Review Consulate General Hong Kong**  
**(SIO/C-99-19)**

Security at Consulate General Hong Kong is strong and appropriate for current threat levels. The post has done an excellent job of correcting security deficiencies that were identified in the 1995 security oversight inspection.

Consulate General Hong Kong has an excellent security program. The inspectors were favorably impressed by security awareness at the post; the initiative of the regional security officer; and the support given to the security program by the Consul General, his deputy, and the administrative officer.